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The Status of State and Nonstate
Actors in Postwar Hostilities:
Restoring the Rule of Law to US
Targeted Killing Operations
Claire Finkelstein *
ABSTRACT
With the killing of Iranian general Qassim Soleimani, the
United States crossed a new frontier in the use of extrajudicial
lethal operations outside of armed conflict. As a state actor,
Soleimani once would have been entirely off-limits as a target
outside the context of a formal armed conflict between the United
States and Iran. The Trump administration’s choice to conduct a
one-off strike on a state military leader indicates that conflicts
among state adversaries are increasingly fought using the
hybridized tools of the war on terror. This Article will argue that
the increasing use of such techniques and the perceived relaxation
of the constraints of international law in conflicts among states
is a regrettable, but foreseeable, result of a certain conception of
violent nonstate actors that immediately followed the 9/11
attacks. Greater clarity about the legal boundaries governing the
use of Bush-era interrogation methods and President Obama’s
dramatic increase in the use of extrajudicial killing against
nonstate actors might have forestalled this development.
This Article focuses on the decision to treat violent nonstate
actors in the war on terror as “unlawful combatants,”—a
framework that deprives them of the traditional protections of
both the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) and the constitutional
guarantees ordinarily extended to criminal defendants. This
ambiguity provided legal impunity for abuse, the impossibility of
achieving convictions at trial for those detained, and an
uncertain legal basis for those who are targeted rather than
captured. The question of status now arises with urgency for
violent state actors like Qassim Soleimani, who was killed by a
US drone strike in January of 2020. This Article will argue that
violent nonstate actors are more properly thought of as civilians
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than combatants but that this approach should not be permitted
to affect the treatment of state actors like Soleimani, whose status
as a state actor implies that he can only be targeted as a state
combatant and then only if in the context of armed conflict.
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INTRODUCTION

With the extrajudicial killing of Qassim Soleimani, an Iranian
major general in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and the
commander of Iran’s Quds Force, the United States ushered in a new
era in the extended war on terror: the use of targeted killing against
state actors outside the context of war. At first, the Trump
administration attempted to justify the killing as valid under the Law
of Armed Conflict (LOAC). The explanations offered, however, were
inconsistent and contradictory.1 Former Secretary of State Mike
Pompeo, for example, claimed that the killing was in response to
imminent threats to American lives.2 But the administration never
produced any evidence of the imminent attack it supposedly
anticipated. Indeed, Pompeo himself admitted that “[w]e don’t know
precisely when and we don’t know precisely where,”3 though President
Trump claimed in a news conference that they were looking to blow up

1.
See Chris Cameron & Helene Cooper, The Trump Administration’s
Fluctuating Explanations for the Soleimani Strikes, N.Y. TIMES (July 9, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/12/us/politics/trump-suleimani-explanations.html
[https://perma.cc/8ZBC-JCMT] (archived Sept. 17, 2021).
2.
See Aaron Rupar, Pompeo’s Shifting Reasons for Killing Soleimani Puts the
Strike on Shaky Legal Ground, VOX (Jan. 7, 2020) https://www.vox.com/2020
/1/7/21054913/pompeo-soleimani-strike-imminent-threat-shifting-rationale
[https://perma.cc/QF9B-DDLS] (archived Sept. 17, 2021).
3.
Peter Baker & Thomas Gibbons-Neff, Esper Says He Saw No Evidence Iran
Targeted 4 Embassies, as Story Shifts Again, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 12, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/12/us/politics/esper-iran-trump-embassies.html
[https://perma.cc/R6F3-NWY3] (archived Sept. 17, 2021).
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our embassy.4 Later, Trump claimed that he thought it could have been
four embassies, military bases, or a lot of other things, but that it was
imminent.5 Secretary of Defense Mark Esper, however, admitted that
he saw no specific evidence to back up Trump’s claims.6 Thereafter,
talk of imminence as a justification for the strike died away quickly.
While no longer in the administration at the time of the Soleimani
strike, former National Security Advisor General H.R. McMaster’s
remarks on this topic may have better reflected the Trump
administration’s thinking on Soleimani. McMaster argued that the
killing was justified because it was “the righteous use of violence.”7 For
this reason, McMaster claimed, imminence was not required. But
scholars and public policy experts have failed to offer any explanation
that would justify the killing under the LOAC.8
Since the Soleimani killing, there have been other strikes on state
actors. In November 2020, Iran’s top nuclear scientist, Mohsen
Fakhrizadeh, was killed in an Israeli ambush.9 According to recent
reporting, Fakhrizadeh was killed with the use of an A.I.-based
machine gun that fired at his vehicle from another car.10 It is also now
clear that the Trump administration was not only fully read into the
intended strike, but President Trump himself, along with Secretary of
State Mike Pompeo and CIA Director Gina Haspel, had participated in
its planning since 2019.11 Indeed, reporting indicated that the two
strikes were related: the United States and Israel were encouraged by
the rather tepid response to the killing of Soleimani to think that a hit
on Fakhrizadeh might be politically feasible.12

4.
5.
6.
7.

See id.
See id.
See id.
Erin Woo, ‘I Don’t Really Care What International Law Said’: H.R. McMaster
Debates
Soleimani
Killing,
Iran,
STANFORD
DAILY
(Mar.
5,
2020),
https://www.stanforddaily.com/2020/03/05/i-dont-really-care-what-international-lawsaid-h-r-mcmaster-debates-soleimani-killing-iran/
[https://perma.cc/9ZXY-DJBJ]
(archived Sept. 17, 2021).
8.
See Ned Temko, State-Sponsored Assassination: New Tools, Old Questions,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Dec. 10, 2020), https://www.csmonitor.com/World/2020/1210/
State-sponsored-assassination-New-tools-old-questions [https://perma.cc/R8ZY-THBL]
(archived Sept. 17, 2021).
9.
See Farnaz Fassihi, David E. Sanger, Eric Schmitt, & Ronen Bergman, Iran’s
Top Nuclear Scientist Killed in Ambush, State Media Say, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 9, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/27/world/middleeast/iran-nuclear-scientistassassinated-mohsen-fakhrizadeh.html [https://perma.cc/4FTT-JX8T] (archived Sept.
17, 2021).
10.
Ronen Bergman & Farnaz Fassihi, The Scientist and the A.I.-Assisted,
Remote-Control
Killing
Machine,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Oct.
26,
2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/18/world/middleeast/iran-nuclear-fakhrizadehassassination-israel.html [https://perma.cc/KA3U-GAB9] (archived Nov. 4, 2021); Zoe
Kleinman, Mohsen Fakhrizadeh: ‘Machine-gun with AI’ Used to Kill Iran Scientist, BBC
(Dec.
7,
2020),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-55214359
[https://perma.cc/8GEJ-Y8UM] (archived Sept. 17, 2021).
11.
Bergman & Fassihi, supra note 10.
12.
Id.
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Unless the United States is at war or has a basis for waging war
on Iran, attacking a high-ranking military official is a clear jus ad
bellum violation. How did US military and national security officials
come to justify such actions? The seeds of acts of war such as these
were sown almost two decades earlier in the approach taken by Bushadministration lawyers as well as military and intelligence officials to
a different problem: the status of violent nonstate actors in Iraq and
Afghanistan who took part in highly militarized terrorist
organizations. Instead of classifying them as either combatants or
civilians, as the principle of distinction requires, the Bush
administration created a sui generis category variously called
“unlawful combatants,” “enemy combatants,” or “unprivileged enemy
belligerents.”13 Obama- and then Trump-administration lawyers
largely maintained this same legal structure, presumably in order to
facilitate the legal justification of targeted killing without a prior need
to attempt capture. Under the US approach to this category, so-called
unlawful combatants lack the rights that attach to combatants under
the laws of war.14 Operating in this “no man’s land” between two legal
regimes––the laws of war and the criminal law––has spawned
confusion and damaged the rule of law.
This Article will focus on the transition from the Bush-era concept
of unlawful combatancy,15 which served to justify the torture of
detainees captured in Iraq and Afghanistan, to the use of that concept
in justifying targeted killing of nonstate and, ultimately, state actors
under Presidents Obama and Trump. Although the United States has
formally ended its engagement in Afghanistan, it will continue to fight
terror through direct action and intelligence operations, an approach
now rendered particularly complex given Taliban rule. In this new
phase of the war on terror, the focus will inevitably shift from nonstate
actors to state actors who commit acts of terror or sponsor terrorism.
The United States has grappled with the threat posed by state
sponsors of terror in the past with respect to Iran, Syria, Saudi Arabia,
North Korea and other nations, but America confronts this threat with
fresh urgency: How will the United States and its allies address acts
of terror that are either directly committed by or sponsored by the
reigning state power?16 Here is where the lasting impact of the post9/11 notion of unlawful combatancy lies: the same techniques that were
justified by the unlawful combatancy framework have now proven

13.
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB 4 (June 2004)
https://www.hrw.org/reports/2004/usa0604/usa0604.pdf (last visited Sept. 17, 2021)
[https://perma.cc/595P-794B] (archived Sept. 17, 2021).
14.
See id.
15.
See, e.g., Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109–366, 120 Stat.
2600; Military Commissions Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111–84, 123 Stat. 2574.
16.
See generally DIANNE E. RENNACK, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R43835, STATE
SPONSORS OF ACTS OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM—LEGISLATIVE PARAMETERS: IN BRIEF
(2021).
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useful in operations against state actors, such as in the case of Qassim
Soleimani. If the international community comes to recognize the
Taliban in Afghanistan as the representative of the Afghan
government, the problem of state-sponsored terrorism will be
particularly stark.17 The absence of a clear legal framework for the use
of targeted killing, particularly remote killing by unmanned aerial
vehicles (UAVs), has left the United States and its allies largely at sea
with regard to the legality of targeted killing operations more
generally.
The legal ambiguity of US targeted killing operations against
nonstate actors has thus spawned a comparable ambiguity with regard
to state actors, a development that in retrospect seems inevitable given
the dramatic increase in the number of targeted killings over the past
three administrations. Overall, since 2010, the United States has
killed upwards of 16,900 people by drone strike, of which at least 2,200
people were civilians.18 Despite the fact that lethal drone technology
has been in use almost since 9/11, the United States still has not
established a clear and unequivocal legal framework for assessing the
conformity of drone strikes to the confines of International
Humanitarian Law (IHL). A practice that is premised on a vague or
uncertain legal foundation will naturally tend to spread, taking its
legal uncertainty with it.19 For this reason, legal ambiguity in one area
of legal practice seeps over into adjacent areas of practice. Where war
is concerned, this legal ambiguity poses a threat to national security
and to the rule of law. Nor will the current difficulties stop at the
boundaries of war. US policy has not only effaced the distinction
between state and nonstate actors, but it has weakened the distinction
between war and crime as well. If the United States continues down
this path, it will weaken not only the law of war, but the constitutional
guarantees protecting domestic criminal suspects as well.
Where targeted killing is concerned, the latter point is amply
demonstrated by the case of Anwar al-Awlaki, an American citizen who

17.
Note that in the case of the Taliban in Afghanistan, this question will be
particularly tricky, given that their accension to power was the result of a military
takeover. Whether the US and its allies will consider the Taliban the legitimate
sovereign of Afghanistan, and whether it will recognize the newly-former Islamic
Emirate of Afghanistan, remains to be seen. See Joshua Keating, No One Wants to Be
the First Country to Recognize the Taliban, SLATE (Aug. 18, 2021, 11:42 AM)
https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2021/08/afghanistan-taliban-internationalrecognition-united-nations.html [https://perma.cc/BT6B-WEJ3] (archived Sept. 17,
2021).
18.
SARA TOTH STUB, CQ PRESS, TARGETED KILLINGS 3 http://library.cqpress.com
/cqresearcher/document.php?action=print&id=cqresrre2021040900 (last visited Sept.
17, 2021) [https://perma.cc/E42Q-3F3V] (archived Sept. 17, 2021).
19.
See generally Christof Heyns, Dapo Akande, Lawrence Hill-Cawthorne, &
Thompson Chengeta, The International Law Framework Regulating the Use of Armed
Drones, 65 ICLQ 791 (2016).
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was killed by a US drone strike in Yemen in 2011.20 In seeking to
justify al-Awlaki’s killing, the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) provided
a problematic legal analysis across several classified memos, arguing
that geography was not a constraint and that the requirement of
“imminence” could be satisfied even when the timeframe was highly
attenuated.21 The point of these memos was to establish a basis for
national self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter, despite the
fact that al-Awlaki was an American citizen and that imminence in any
traditional sense was almost surely lacking.22 The OLC memo also
insisted that the decision regarding al-Awlaki’s fate was not
reviewable in an Article III court, a proposition shockingly embraced
by the federal district court itself when presented with a petition from
al-Awlaki’s father.23
It is now time to rethink the Bush-era legal framework from the
post–9/11 period and seek to harmonize US policy and domestic law
with basic principles of International Humanitarian Law (IHL). The
United States must also, however, harmonize national security law
and practice with constitutional principles of domestic criminal law,
most importantly the concept of due process. It is critical for the United
States to undertake this work now, before the next significant foreign
or domestic threat emerges. Grappling with normative questions
relating to military engagement or law enforcement becomes
impossible in the heat of battle. At a moment when our military
presence overseas, specifically in the Middle East, has been nearly
eliminated and the United States is entering a period of reduced
kinetic engagement, the United States can afford to reconsider the
legal framework needed to justify military engagement with violent
foreign extremists.
Surveying the available options, there is an array of possible legal
frameworks available for this purpose, distributed along what could be
thought of as a “combatancy scale.” On one end of the scale, the United
States could accord full combatancy status, such as would normally
attach to members of a government-controlled state military. On the
other end are domestic criminal suspects, who are normally protected
from wrongful deprivations of liberty and other punishment through
constitutional guarantees that protect their right to due process in US
courts. In between is a series of hybrid options, which includes Bush

20.
See generally SCOTT SHANE, OBJECTIVE TROY: A TERRORIST, A PRESIDENT,
AND THE RISE OF THE DRONE (2016).
21.
See generally U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT ATT’Y GEN.,
MEMORANDUM REGARDING APPLICABILITY OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS AND THE

CONSTITUTION TO CONTEMPLATED LETHAL OPERATION AGAINST SHAYKH ANWAR ALAWLAGI (July 16, 2010) https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/pages/attachments
/2015/04/02/2010-07-16_-_olc_aaga_barron_-_al-aulaqi.pdf
[https://perma.cc/EL5JLQ2P] (archived Sept. 17, 2021).
22.
See id.
23.
Al-Aulaqi v. Panetta, 35 F. Supp. 3d 56, 81–82 (D.D.C. 2014).
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“unlawful combatancy” doctrine. Other hybrid options can be located
somewhere in the middle of the continuum.
This Article will argue in favor of a hybrid approach that is
different from the problematic doctrine of unlawful combatancy and
that resides closer to the civilian criminal law model. The position
defended here will differentiate more clearly between state and
nonstate actors and thus would do more to preserve the distinction
between war and crime. On the model for which this Article will argue,
nonstate military operations, whether in or out of armed conflict, can
be considered international criminal conspiracies, bringing the status
of violent nonstate actors more into line with the way the United States
has approached drug lords and other illegal international traffickers.
On the proposed approach, the United States would be better able to
distinguish a nonstate actor like Anwar al-Awlaki from a state actor
like Qassim Soleimani since nonstate actors would be assessed
according to a civilian legal framework by which state actors, like
Soleimani, would be immune outside of combatancy. Under the
approach proposed here, the full combatancy model would be reserved
for state actors in times of war, leaving nonstate actors like Anwar alAwlaki on the side of agents of domestic terror rather than on the side
of state military organizations, such as Iran’s Quds Force, despite the
fact that al-Qaeda and ISIS have amassed sufficient force to require a
military-level response.
The discussion will begin by exploring the traditional concept of
combatancy and explaining why violent state actors are, but nonstate
actors are not, “combatants” in any meaningful sense of that term. The
Article will then turn to the Bush administration’s use of the concept
of “unlawful combatancy” and consider both the conceptual and
practical difficulties with that notion. The Article will then attempt
to sketch an alternative conceptual framework to the problem of state
sponsors of terrorism, drawing a sharp contrast with the hybrid
approach proposed to nonstate actors.
II.

THE TRADITIONAL NOTION OF COMBATANCY

Traditionally, armed conflict took place solely between the
militaries of different international states, with soldiers wearing
identifiable uniforms, on a clearly demarcated battlefield, carrying
their arms openly. In recent years, the traditional parameters of armed
conflict have changed dramatically. Most of the wars of the twenty-first
century have not been fought between one state and another but
between states and violent nonstate actors, usually fighting without
uniforms and basing their operations on subterfuge rather than open
combat.24 From the standpoint of the traditional law of war, it is

24.
See Wendy Pearlman & Kathleen Gallagher Cunningham, Nonstate Actors,
Fragmentation, and Conflict Processes, 56(i) J. CONFLICT RES. 3, 3 (2012).
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difficult to characterize their operations. What is the status of
individuals connected in a variety of ways with large, nonstate
militaristic organizations who are bent on the destruction of life and
property? How should state governments approach such nonstate
militias, and what legal frameworks should govern our operations
against them? Critically, for present purposes, how should the United
States draw the line between state and nonstate actors, and what
implications does this distinction have for the LOAC and US policy?
The answer adopted by the Bush administration in the immediate
aftermath of 9/11 has had a profound impact on the law of armed
conflict, including with regard to state actors and the perceived
permissibility of extrajudicial killing. It has threatened to erode the
distinction between state and nonstate actors and in time may
ultimately do damage to domestic criminal law rights as well.
Prior to 9/11, the assumption had always been that anyone
connected in certain ways with a state military operation would fall
under the LOAC and therefore under the Geneva Conventions as well.
If they were members of a foreign governmental military organization,
they were “combatants,” and their treatment was governed by the
LOAC. This body of international law determined the treatment of
foreign combatants with respect to detention and interrogation, as well
as with respect to targeted killing operations. Under the LOAC,
combatants’ status provides rights, privileges, and protections.25 Their
status, however, also puts them at risk: combatants are targetable 24/7
because of the special role they occupy relative to the state.26 They are
not targetable because of their activity or the danger they present in a
given moment. A combatant can be targeted when he is sleeping,
watching a movie, taking a shower, etc., as long as he retains his status
as a combatant. If he loses that combatant status because he is hors de
combat, he will no longer be targetable.27 If he is taken prisoner, he
acquires prisoner-of-war (POW) status, which protects him under the
Geneva Conventions against abusive treatment.28 Once the war ends,
he must be repatriated to his country of origin.29
Much of the law of war was based originally on the concept of
reciprocity, a notion that is often referred to in the just war literature
under the heading of “the moral equality of soldiers,” or “the moral
equality thesis.”30 This thesis maintains that all individuals having the

25.
See Claire Finkelstein, Killing in War and the Moral Equality Thesis, 32 (2)
SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 184, 198 (2016).
26.
See JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, INT’L COMM. OF THE
RED CROSS, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW VOLUME 1: RULES 164
(Cambridge Univ. Press 2005).
27.
See Finkelstein, supra note 25, at 196; id.
28.
See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 17,
Aug. 12, 1949.
29.
See id. at art. 118.
30.
See Finkelstein, supra note 25, at 185; MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST
WARS: A MORAL ARGUMENT WITH HISTORICAL ILLUSTRATIONS 34, 37, 41 (4th ed. 2006).
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status of combatants in an armed conflict possess an equal right to
kill.31 This is so regardless of the justice of the cause for which they
are fighting. A German soldier fighting for Hitler’s army during the
Second World War has the same right to kill a French soldier that the
latter has to kill him, even though the Frenchman, whose country is
under unlawful occupation, is fighting a just war, and the German,
whose country is unlawfully occupying other sovereign nations, is not.
The fact that Germany is in violation of international law does not
mean that the German soldier is himself violating the law of war. In
invading France, the German soldier participates in an action that is
illegal under international law, yet despite that fact, he is within his
rights as a combatant when he kills. What gives the soldier “combatant
immunity” is the fact that he acts on behalf of a state from which he
derives his authority and his orders.32 By contrast with orders from a
criminal organization, the orders from military superiors immunize
him in most cases from liability.
The question of who is a combatant is one of the most critical in
the LOAC. It is one that defines the application of the most important
of the principles of the law of war, namely the principle of distinction.33
Because the principle of distinction maintains that combatants may be
targeted at any time but that civilians may never be targeted, barring
active assistance to enemy forces, the permissibility of the use of force
in armed conflict will depend on the ability to identify clearly the
parameters of combatancy and to articulate its implications.
The traditional elements of combatancy are usually identified as
follows: (1) combatants must be commanded by a responsible person
who wields authority over his subordinates, (2) they must have a fixed
distinctive emblem recognizable at a distance, (3) they must carry their
arms openly, and (4) they must conduct their operations in accordance
with the laws and customs of war.34 These principles are best
understood as indications of combatancy, rather than conditions by
which combatancy can be established.35 Thus, the command structure
mentioned in the first of the four elements above can only be
established by the relevant state authority. The significance of the

31.
32.

See Finkelstein, supra note 25, at 185.
See Geoffrey S. Corn, Thinking the Unthinkable: Has the Time Come to Offer
Combatant Immunity to Non-State Actors?, 22 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 253, 256 (2011).
33.
See generally Claire Finkelstein, Responsibility for Acts of War and the Moral
Equality Thesis, 32 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 184 (2016).
34.
See Convention (ii) with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land and
its Annex: Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, INT’L COMM.
RED
CROSS
(July
29,
1899),
https://ihldatabases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Article.xsp?action=openDocument&documentId=9F
E084CDAC63D10FC12563CD00515C4D
[https://perma.cc/7TGC-NTYD]
(archived
Sept. 19, 2021) (hereinafter Hague Covention 1899); see also Christopher Kutz, The
Difference that Uniforms Make, 33(2) PHIL. & PUB. AFFS. 148, 148–80 (2005).
35.
See generally Kutz, supra note 34.
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uniform, then, is that it indicates membership in the state’s command
structure.
Arguably, combatancy status has depended traditionally on
rather clear lines of demarcation between war and not-war: the ability
to distinguish combatants from civilians depends on a prior ability to
identify a battlefield as well as to know temporally when wars begin
and when they end. In contemporary armed conflict, where the
geographical location of war is ill-defined and the temporal identity of
war seems to be attenuated, it is difficult to identify temporal and
geographic boundaries on war. Unsurprisingly, then, the identification
of combatancy remains hazy.
The problem of definition has arisen acutely since 9/11 with
respect to nonstate actors, particularly those outside the formal arena
of hostilities. While the Bush and Obama administrations struggled
with the question of the extent of presidential war-making authority
with respect to such actors, the legal frameworks they adopted came
up short in various ways. The Bush administration’s efforts during the
war on terror to establish the status of nonstate actors in a way that
the US government saw to its advantage, whatever its merits, have
now permanently impacted official thinking about the legal status of
state actors who engage in terroristic activities, thus weakening the
sovereignty norms that have traditionally kept war within “civilized”
bounds.
Most state actors, even those who resort to violence outside the
context of war, satisfy at least the first three of the above indices of
combatancy. Violent nonstate actors, however, do not usually fit these
criteria since they do not operate in a state-based command structure.
They usually do not wear a uniform or other distinctive insignia or
carry arms openly, and they do not typically conduct their operations
in accordance with the laws and customs of war. The Taliban likely did
not count as combatants in the traditional sense at the time of the 9/11
attacks, though the point can be debated, given that they were the
reigning power in Afghanistan at the time and operated in a
hierarchical structure of authority. In the wake of their takeover of
Afghanistan in 2021, however, it will be particularly challenging to
deny state-actor status to the Taliban and, hence, to acknowledge
combatancy status for any future military conflicts. But, as with alQaeda, the Taliban often fail to carry arms openly or wear uniforms or
other distinctive insignia, and they most certainly refuse to abide by
the laws and customs of war. In the absence of greater legal clarity
surrounding the identity of both state and nonstate actors, US
operations and those of allied nations will continue to operate in a noman’s-land of legal and moral uncertainty—a situation that creates
confusion about the legitimacy of US operations abroad and, risk for
US troops and national security.
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III. UNLAWFUL COMBATANCY AND THE BUSH DOCTRINE
The question of the relationship of nonstate actors to the notion of
combatancy is strictly speaking not a new one. During Vietnam, the
United States confronted this very question. Though trained and
funded by the North Vietnamese government, the Vietcong were
nonstate actors who engaged in terroristic activity outside the normal
framework of war.36 Unlike al-Qaeda, however, the Vietcong fought
alongside and on behalf of a clearly identified state entity. Was the
category of “unlawful combatancy” necessary to meet the demands of
the new asymmetric warfare, or would the traditional concepts of
“combatant” and “civilian” have been adequate to accommodate the
range of roles required to articulate the rights and responsibilities of
those involved in armed conflict? It would be difficult to exaggerate the
impact of the decision to create the hybrid designation on the law of
armed conflict in the United States over the course of the past twenty
years. The concept has been passed down from the early days
immediately following the attacks on 9/11 to four presidents, without
any serious dissention or doubt on the part of the national security
professionals who advise the Oval Office. The notion of unlawful
combatancy has now come to impact not only the legal status of
nonstate actors in the law of armed conflict but also the status of state
actors who sponsor terrorism. Clarifying this hybrid category is now
urgent.
In 2002, then-Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld announced
that captured members of the Taliban and al-Qaeda would henceforth
be considered “unlawful combatants” and that, as such, they were not
entitled to POW status or other specific protections under Common
Article III of the Geneva Conventions.37 POW status would have meant
that the detainees had the right to refuse to answer questions, the right
to counsel of their choosing, and the right to repatriation following the
cessation of hostilities, all entitlements the United States saw as
threatening to its efforts to win the war on terror.
Domestically, the Bush administration felt it had the full faith of
the American people, given the broad grant of authority it had received
from Congress under the 2001 and 2002 Authorizations for the Use of
Military Force (AUMFs). These grants of authority, particularly the
former, were the ultimate blank checks from Congress. They specified
no sunset date and no geographical limitations on the use of force.
Thus, the designation of the category of unlawful combatancy seemed
a minor assertion of presidential power in the face of an apparently

36.
See STEPHEN BIDDLE, NONSTATE WARFARE: THE MILITARY METHODS OF
GUERILLAS, WARLORDS, AND MILITIAS Ch. 9 (Princeton University Press, 2021).
37.
Donald Rumsfeld & Peter Pace, Defense Department Briefing, C-SPAN (Jan.
22,
2002),
https://www.c-span.org/video/?168309-1/defense-department-briefing
[https://perma.cc/3TRC-XPEZ] (archived Nov. 5, 2021).
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limitless authorization to take all necessary and proper steps to combat
terrorism.38
It later emerged, however, that these legal machinations were in
all likelihood part of an effort to justify the use of torture and the
application of other harsh techniques in interrogation in the
application of what was known as the Rendition, Detention and
Interrogation (RDI) program.39 Justifying such techniques from a legal
standpoint posed a profound challenge, especially given the numerous
sources of law, both domestic and international, that condemned the
RDI program as illegal. According members of al-Qaeda and the
Taliban full combatant status would have made the application of
harsh interrogation techniques illegal under international law, under
both the Geneva Conventions and the Convention on Torture.40 Even
more worrisome for the Bush administration was the existence of
domestic federal law that would potentially provide a basis for
subjecting all those involved in the RDI program to criminal liability.41
The concept of “unlawful combatancy” was intended to situate the RDI
program firmly on the war powers side of the war/crime distinction,
which would give the administration both greater latitude and greater
secrecy with regard to the treatment of detainees. But this strategy ran
a risk on the other side, namely that there would be pressure to apply
the traditional concept of combatancy and that the RDI program would
be seen as a war crime. Thus, the Bush administration had the complex
task of fending off civil law-enforcement protections and protocol on the
one hand, at the same time that it needed to keep law of war concepts
at bay.
In declaring members of al-Qaeda and the Taliban unlawful
combatants, the Bush administration made it more difficult to
reconcile the status of violent nonstate actors with both domestic and
international law. The identification of this category was result driven:
it was intended to combine legal features––such as targetability

38.
The broadest grant of authority took place under the “associated forces”
doctrine in the 2001 AUMF, a phrase that has been used to extend Congressional
authorization from Al-Qaeda and the Taliban to ISIS, many years after it was written
and to broaden the administration’s military mandate from the original domain of
Afghanistan to Syria, Yemen and other surrounding areas. Some scholars have argued,
however, that Congress never intended this phrase to import such a broad grant of
authority, and that the authorization was always intended to be limited to the original
terror groups the United States undertook to fight in the immediate aftermath of 9/11.
39.
See S. SELECT COMM. ON INTEL., S. REP. NO. 113-288, Committee Study of the
Central Intelligence Agency’s Detention and Interrogation Program, 20 (2014)
https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/documents/CRPT-113srpt288.pdf
(last visited Sept. 17, 2021) [https://perma.cc/H2U7-D4NS] (archived Sept. 15, 2021).
40.
Geneva Convention III, Art. 17, ¶ 4.
41.
For a more detailed discussion of accountability for torture, see Claire
Finkelstein & Stephen Xenakis, Repairing the Damage from Illegal Acts of State: The
Costs of Failed Accountability for Torture in INTERROGATION AND TORTURE:
INTEGRATING EFFICACY WITH LAW AND MORALITY 499–502 (Steven Barela, Mark Fallon,
Gloria Gaggioli, & Jens David Ohlin, Oxford Univ. Press 2020).
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without combatant immunity and POW status––that the Bush
administration believed it needed to wage the war on terror. This
designation, or one of its synonyms, such as “unprivileged enemy
belligerents,” has remained ever since and has been endorsed by
Congress as well as by subsequent administrations, in dealing with
nonstate actors.42
While a general consensus existed that members of terrorist
organizations like al-Qaeda, arguably the Taliban, and later ISIS were
not combatants in the traditional sense, there has been no general
agreement among experts about the use of the designation “unlawful
combatants” or “unprivileged belligerent,” or what precisely those
labels should be taken to mean.43 There was little precedent for the
Bush administration’s particular use of that expression, but they
nevertheless drew support from Ex Parte Quirin, a World War II-era
case involving non-uniformed German U-boat operators who turned up
off the coast of Long Island.44 Following their capture and arrest, the
United States had to decide how to handle the German officers, a task
rendered particularly complex given that two of the defendants were
United States citizens.45 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court not only
denied the defendants the right to criminal trials but also denied them
the right to POW status on the ground that as spies they were illicit
saboteurs, rather than combatants, and were therefore violating the
rules of war. All eight defendants were convicted of treason and
espionage, and six out of the eight were executed.46 The Quirin case
was controversial at the time, given its use of the “unlawful
combatancy” label, but its impact was limited to the fairly specialized
circumstances under which the arrests took place.47 The concept did
not reappear after that until Donald Rumsfeld’s 2002 announcement
that the same label was being adopted for al-Qaeda and Taliban
fighters.48
Unlike in 1942, the Bush administration’s use of the unlawful
combatancy designation took root in common parlance and official legal

42.
The expression “unprivileged enemy belligerent” was used in the 2006
Military Commissions Act, H.R. 2647-385, §948(a)(7), and retained even when that Act
was revised in 2009.
43.
John Bellinger, Unlawful Enemy Combatants, OPINION JURIS (Jan. 17, 2007),
http://opiniojuris.org/2007/01/17/unlawful-enemy-combatants/ [https://perma.cc/NYN3EGWC] (archived Sept. 15, 2021).
44.
See LIBR. OF CONG.: MIL. LEGAL RES, NAZI SABOTEURS TRIAL (Aug, 15, 2014)
https://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/nazi-saboteurs-trial.html
[https://perma.cc/M7RF-QCXK] (archived Sept. 15, 2021).
45.
See Ex Parte Quinn v. Cox, Provost Marshal 317 U.S. 1, 20 (1946).
46.
See LIBR. OF CONG., supra note 44.
47.
See Andrew Kent, Judicial Review for Enemy Fighters: The Court’s Fateful
Turn in Ex Parte Quirin, the Nazi Saboteur Case, 66 VAND. L. R. 153 (2013); Donald
Rumsfeld & Richard B. Myers, Defense Department Briefing, C-SPAN (Jan. 11, 2002),
https://www.c-span.org/video/?168158-1/defense-department-briefing
[https://perma.cc/46UM-732F] (archived Nov. 29, 2021).
48.
Rumsfield & Pace, supra note 37.
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reasoning about the legality of our practices, and despite criticism of
many aspects of Bush-era counterterrorism policy, few commentators
seriously questioned its usage. Echoing the infamous August 1, 2002,
OLC memo’s defense of post–9/11 detention and interrogation
practices,49 the public appears to have accepted the view that the laws
of war are not binding when dealing with an enemy who himself
refuses to be bound by those laws. The argument that Bushadministration lawyers pressed implicitly, although not formally, was
that since the enemy is totally uncivilized, and knows no law of any
sort, the United States is legally and morally permitted to ignore the
law of war in defending against them. As then-Vice President Cheney
said in a famous television interview in 2005:
We also have to work, though, sort of the dark side, if you will. We've got to spend
time in the shadows in the intelligence world. A lot of what needs to be done here
will have to be done quietly, without any discussion, using sources and methods
that are available to our intelligence agencies, if we're going to be successful.
That's the world these folks operate in, and so it's going to be vital for us to use
any means at our disposal, basically, to achieve our objective.50

Cheney saw this as an opportunity to push the outer boundaries of
presidential war power, and he viewed any restriction on that
authority as an infringement on the executive branch. Specifically, the
philosophy he pushed to justify exempting detainees in the war on
terror from the reach of Common Article III of the Geneva Conventions
was based on the idea that the enemy forfeits all protection under
international law as soon as it is found to reject the laws of war
themselves. This might be aptly dubbed the “Forfeiture Theory” of
common international legal obligations.
The Forfeiture Theory reflects a combination of realism in
international relations, legal realism about jurisprudential concepts,
and an unrelentingly skeptical view of the provisions of international
law. Law professors Jack Goldsmith and Eric Posner, for example,
have offered a sustained defense of this position.51 On the Goldsmith–
Posner view, international law is a coordination game, which each
state enters into for the sake of maximizing its own welfare.52 As
Goldsmith and Posner argue, the lack of robust enforcement in
international law means that the only true obligations nations have

49.
See OFF. LEGAL COUNSEL, MEMORANDUM FOR ALBERTO R. GONZALES
COUNSEL OF THE PRESIDENT RE: STANDARDS OF CONDUCT OF INTERROGATION UNDER 18
U.S.C. §§ 2340–2340A (2002).
50.
Dan Froomkin, Cheney’s ‘Dark Side’ is Showing, WASH. POST (Nov. 7, 2005),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/blog/2005/11/07/BL20051107
00793.html [https://perma.cc/8N4W-8LN4] (archived Sept. 15, 2021).
51.
See generally JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW (1st ed. 2005).
52.
Rumsfeld & Pace, supra note 37.
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towards one another are those that are self-imposed for mutual gain.53
This skeptical view rejects the idea of jus cogens as a basis for duties
under international law—namely duties that apply regardless of
whether they are voluntarily accepted by treaty or another vehicle that
is subject to agreement. The Forfeiture Theory depends on this
skepticism.54
In fact, the duty to abide by the law of war is nonreciprocal,
meaning that it is not dependent on the willingness of other states to
abide by the laws of war themselves. While reciprocity may account for
the origins of just war theory––namely that it is mutually beneficial
for all parties if states abide by the law of war generally––it is a great
leap from that to the conclusion that if a state fails to follow the laws
of war, other states are thereby excused from doing so. The Forfeiture
Theory thus depends on a confusion of level: from the fact that a
practice emerged because participants in the practice saw themselves
as better off if all parties commit to that practice, it does not follow that
any state can exempt itself from its obligations under the practice in
the future.
The Bush Doctrine eventually began to soften with respect to
forfeiture and the need to adhere to international law. While the Bush
administration was never willing to pronounce the applicability of the
Geneva Conventions to detainees in the war on terror, the Obama
administration did bring its policies somewhat more into line with
international law. Even the latter administration, however,
substantially retained the concept of unlawful combatancy as
unchanged from the Bush era, despite eliminating the term and
distancing itself from the Bush-era associations of it with the RDI
program.55 The failure on the part of the Obama administration to
repudiate and dismantle the legal structure that had been used to
justify torture, however, set the United States on a profoundly
destructive path with regard to the rule of law. The lack of clarity in
this area of the law, combined with a dangerous expansion of
presidential war-making authority in the United States and
quiescence on the part of Congress, has resulted in the near-complete
disregard of legal constraints when it comes to fighting violent
nonstate actors abroad.

53.
54.

Id.
It is important to distinguish here between the Geneva Conventions and the
traditional Law of Armed Conflict. The former is a treaty, and as such is not binding
unless it is specifically accepted and ratified. The latter, however, contains provisions
that rest on an even more secure foundation than the Geneva Conventions, which, in
principle, is a set of universally binding doctrines that do not require agreement or
ratification to impose obligations on all nations. It is these non-delegable aspects of the
Law of Armed Conflict that render the Forfeiture Theory inapplicable.
55.
The RDI program ended in 2009 per executive order. See Scott Shane, Mark
Mazzetti, & Helene Cooper, Obama Reverses Key Bush Security Policies, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan.
22,
2009),
https://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/23/us/politics/23obama.html
[https://perma.cc/2T2A-VDAR] (archived Sept. 15, 2021).
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IV. OBAMA AND THE TARGETING OF NONSTATE ACTORS
Under the Obama administration, the Forfeiture Theory morphed
into a somewhat more moderate hybrid approach for dealing with
violent nonstate actors, one that purported to conform more fully to
international law. Surprisingly, the Obama administration did not
alter the fundamental treatment of the notion of combatancy, which
remained largely the same apart from some slight modifications. On
the plus side, in a 2009 Department of Justice (DOJ) memo dealing
with recent habeas petitions that had been filed by Guantanamo
prisoners, the DOJ rejected the term “enemy combatant” and all
preceding variants of that expression and, in addition, restricted
detention of members of al-Qaeda and the Taliban to those who had
given “substantial” support to the belligerency.56 Additionally, there
was a shift of rationale: the new account did not rely on the president’s
commander-in-chief authority, independent of congressional
authorization. Instead, it relied entirely on the 2001 AUMF.57 The
government’s reply brief stated:
The President has the authority to detain persons that the President determines
planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on
September 11, 2001, and persons who harbored those responsible for those
attacks. The President also has the authority to detain persons who were part
of, or substantially supported, Taliban or al-Qaida forces or associated forces that
are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners,
including any person who has committed a belligerent act, or has directly
supported hostilities, in aid of such enemy armed forces.58

On the minus side, however, the DOJ maintained that “the
particular facts and circumstances justifying detention will vary from
case to case and may require the identification and analysis of various
analogues from traditional international armed conflicts.”59 The
Obama administration thus partially solved its conceptual challenge
by resisting all efforts to systematize its legal approach in this area
and insisting on approaching matters on a case-by-case basis. The

56.

See DEP’T OF JUST., PRESS RELEASE NO. 09-232, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
ENEMY COMBATANT DEFINTION FOR GUANTANAMO DETAINEES (2009)
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/department-justice-withdraws-enemy-combatantdefinition-guantanamo-detainees (last visited Sept. 17, 2021) [https://perma.cc/FN8S6HSK] (archived Sept. 16, 2021); Respondents’ Memorandum Regarding the
Government’s Detention Authority Relative to Detainees Held at Guantanamo Bay at 1,
In Re Guantanamo Bay Litig., Misc. No. 08-442 (TFH) (D.D.C. Mar. 13, 2009).
57.
See Politico Staff, DOJ Withdraws ‘Enemy Combatant’ Definition, POLITICO
(Mar.
13,
2008),
https://www.politico.com/story/2009/03/doj-withdraws-enemycombatant-definition-019985 [https://perma.cc/Q5J7-KU75] (archived Sept. 16, 2021).
58.
Respondents’ Memorandum Regarding the Government’s Detention
Authority Relative to Detainees Held at Guantanamo Bay at 2, In Re Guantanamo Bay
Litig., Misc. No. 08-442 (TFH).
59.
Id.
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purpose of this approach was presumably to leave the administration
maximum latitude in its dealings with nonstate actors.
Of particular relevance is the Obama DOJ’s rejection of the
position that Guantanamo detainees should be treated as “civilians
directly participating in hostilities” and that the United States may
only detain individuals who belong to that category.60 The government
argued that under the law of war, the United States was not limited to
that category of persons and that “a contrary conclusion would
improperly reward an enemy that violates the laws of war by operating
as a loose network and camouflaging its forces as civilians.”61 As
explained below, it is not clear that relying on the “direct participation”
standard would have reduced the Obama administration’s authority to
pursue al-Qaeda and the Taliban significantly, and meanwhile it would
have helped to protect the integrity of the law of war, as well as guard
against detainee mistreatment.
Under both the Bush and the Obama administrations’ approaches
to violent nonstate actors, the United States saw itself as involved in
an armed conflict with highly organized, non-governmental forces who
controlled significant territory which they used to carry out sustained
military operations. They distinguished military campaigns in these
areas from operations in places like Yemen, Syria, and Somalia, where
many of the more controversial targeted killing strikes were carried
out.62 Recognizing this distinction, the Obama administration
regarded the latter areas as governed not by the LOAC, but rather by
Presidential Policy Guidance (PPG), which assesses the permissibility
of using lethal force according to a legal framework that more
resembles a civilian law-enforcement model than a LOAC model.63 In
so doing, the Obama administration was able to avoid having to
characterize individuals within the zone of armed conflict as
“civilians,” which was presumably something it urgently wanted to
avoid.
In combat in which violent nonstate actors are sufficiently
organized and the level of violence sufficiently intense, nonstate actors
can still be understood as “civilians directly participating” in
hostilities, but they are civilians participating in a form of war that is
difficult to characterize. It cannot be characterized as a non-

60.
61.
62.

Id. at 8.
Id. at 1.
See ACLU, Procedures for Approving Direct Action Agianst Terrorist Targets
Located Outside the United States and Areas of Active Hositilies, ACLU (May 22, 2013)
https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/presidential_policy_guidance_0.
pdf [https://perma.cc/MX2G-CSJ3] (archived Sept. 16, 2021); see generally Rita Siemion,
Presidential Policy Guidance: Procedures for Approving Direct Action Against Terrorist
Targets Located Outside The United States and Areas of Active Hostilities, 56
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 1209 (2017).
63.
Id.
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international armed conflict (NIAC)64 because it does not remain
within the boundaries of a single state. And it is not an international
armed conflict (IAC), since it does not involve one state fighting
another. The detainability and targetability of individuals in such a
conflict would seem to follow, which still leaves them protected under
international law against inhumane treatment. There would be no
requirement of capture prior to targeting since their conduct would
suggest that they are what the International Committee of the Red
Cross has called individuals serving a “continuous combat function.”
That would make them continuously targetable as well, though they
had full combatant status.65
Outside the zone of armed conflict, however, matters would be
different, and it is here that the PPG becomes relevant. Despite having
conducted hundreds of direct action strikes in the previous four years,
Obama did not introduce a legal framework for targeted killing until
May of 2013, toward the end of his first term in office.66 Even then, the
resulting legal framework left much to be desired. Under the PPG,
targeted killing is only permissible when capture is infeasible and
there is “near certainty” that no civilians will be harmed.67 Unlike a
law of war framework, which makes it permissible to target
combatants 24/7 based on their status and imposes no duty to attempt
capture, nonstate actors under the PPG are considered civilians who
are assisting in the violent operations of their military counterparts.
Outside of zones of armed conflict, the test for targetability approaches
a civilian law-enforcement model, which permits targeting only if the
individual poses an imminent risk of harm based on his or her current
or anticipated activity. When this standard was actually
operationalized, however, the treatment of nonstate actors in the
domain of the PPG did not match the theory terribly well, and the
resulting military operations ended up looking a great deal more like
the former Bush unlawful combatancy standard.

64.
See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Convetions of 12 August 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), June
8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3. [hereinafter Additional Protocol I]; see also Direct Participation
in
Hostilities,
HOW
DOES
LAW
PROTECT
IN
WAR?,
https://casebook.icrc.org/glossary/direct-participation-hostilities#:~:text=In%
20international%20humanitarian%20law%20the,dangers%20arising%20from%20milit
ary%20operations (last visited Sept. 17, 2021) [https://perma.cc/8NYE-KQAK] (archived
Sept. 17, 2021).
65.
See Sabrina Henry, Exploring the “Continuous Combat Function” Concept in
Armed Conflicts: Time for an Extended Application?, INT’L R. RED CROSS 267, 270–72
(2018),
https://international-review.icrc.org/articles/exploring-continuous-combatfunction-concept-armed-conflicts-time-extended-application (last visited Sept. 22, 2021)
[https://perma.cc/QD9W-BL7R] (archived on Sept. 22, 2021).
66.
See ACLU, supra note 62.
67.
See Heather Brandon, Will Obama’s Targeted Killing Policy Say What “Areas
of
Active
Hostilities”
Means?,
LAWFARE
(May
5,
2016,
6:31
AM),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/will-obamas-targeted-killing-policy-say-what-areasactive-hostilities-means [https://perma.cc/429U-SNUD] (archived Sept. 16, 2021).
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Anwar al-Awlaki, for example, was in theory entitled to treatment
under the PPG according to the civilian framework appropriate for law
enforcement.68 Yet the formal parameters of the PPG were left to
interpretation by the Office of Legal Counsel,69 which found that the
operation against al-Awlaki in Yemen was “part of the noninternational armed conflict with al-Qaida.”70 Nevertheless, the OLC
memo concluded that the targeted killing of al-Awlaki would fall
within the reach of the law of armed conflict as recognized by the
Supreme Court in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,71 which held that US
citizenship was not a bar to detention in war.72 As in Hamdi, the
intentional targeting of an American citizen would be covered by the
“public authority” justification, based on the fact that there was a
national security imperative for engaging in direct action abroad. In
other words, under the OLC memo interpreting the PPG, and despite
his American citizenship, al-Awlaki’s activities were treated as an
extension of the conflict in Iraq and Afghanistan, which made alAwlaki targetable without prior attempt to capture.73
In a gesture to the PPG, the OLC memo briefly dealt with the duty
to capture by saying that both the Department of Defense and the
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), who were to conduct the operation
jointly, “represented that they intend to capture rather than target alAwlaki if feasible; yet we also understand that an operation by either
agency to capture al-Awlaki in Yemen would be infeasible at this
time.”74 In this way, the Obama administration essentially continued
the “unlawful combatancy” framework established by the Bush
administration under another name: Instead of treating nonstate
actors as “unlawful combatants,” they paid lip service to the distinction
between combatants and civilians. But they ended up mirroring the
Bush solution both by treating nonstate actors as part of a NIAC, even
if these actors were outside the formal areas of hostilities, and by
casually declaring capture “infeasible,” without offering a detailed
analysis of that concept.75

68.
69.

See Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F.Supp. 2d 1, 10 (D.D.C. 2010).
See OFF. OF LEGAL COUNSEL, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., MEMORANDUM FOR THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL RE: APPLICABILITY OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS AND THE
CONSTITUTION TO CONTEMPLATED LETHAL OPERATIONS AGAINST SHAYKH ANWAR ALAULAQI 12–14 (2010).
70.
Id. at 24.
71.
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 519–24 (2004) (authorizing military to treat
American citizen as ‘enemy belligerent’ under the law of war despite citizenship status).
72.
Id. at 519.
73.
See OFF. OF LEGAL COUNSEL, supra note 69, at 23–24.
74.
Id. at 40.
75.
The OLC memo also used an expanded conception of “imminence” in order to
reach the conclusion that Anwar Al-Awlaki posed an “imminent” threat of harm, and
that therefore the U.S. could not safely wait for an opportune moment to effectuate
capture. See id. at 39–40.
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Despite the fact that the PPG was intended to provide an alternate
legal framework to the LOAC, one appropriate for dealing with
civilians outside the context of war, the interpretation of the Obama
Justice Department and the Department of Defense of doctrines like
imminence and feasibility of capture, effectively stripped the PPG of
its civilian characteristics. The basic distinction between war and notwar is not sustainable if individuals are treated outside of zones of
armed conflict as targetable without prior attempts to capture and
without affording them an opportunity to surrender.
The only justification for targeted killing outside of war can be
self-defense, whether national self-defense, under Article 51 of the UN
Charter, or individual self-defense, based on a threat to an individual
in the territory from which the threat emanates. If it is viewed as legal
to kill summarily, as part of what is essentially a law-enforcement
operation within a sovereign nation that is unwilling or unable to
exercise control over the source of the threat themselves, the United
States will not only have ignored the in bello rules for conducting war,
but it will also have given short shrift to the concept of state
sovereignty, a bedrock ad bellum principle in international law.
Whenever legal distinctions are effaced, there will be a resulting lack
of clarity on both sides of the line. In the case of the interpretation of
the PPG, the rules for civilian capture and the use of legal force outside
of war were distorted on Obama’s watch. Ultimately that damages both
the law of war and the rules for civilian engagement.
By contrast, under this Article’s approach, violent, nonstate actors
are best regarded as civilians outside of identifiable zones of armed
conflict engaged in criminal activity. When there is a war to which
their efforts are attached, they should be considered civilians
participating in hostilities who thereby acquire an activity-based
targetability outside zones of armed conflict—but only when capture is
truly infeasible and the threat they pose is imminent. Within domains
of active hostilities, they are also targetable based on their activities,
but these activities make them continuously targetable without prior
need for capture. Part VI will explore this taxonomy in greater detail.
This Article will first turn, however, to the next chapter in the war on
terror, namely the use of targeted killing by the Trump administration
and the expansion of the Bush doctrine to the case of state actors who
engage in, or otherwise support, acts of terror.
V.

TRUMP AND THE EXTRAJUDICIAL KILLING OF STATE ACTORS

The use of targeted killing reached a fever pitch under the Trump
administration. Reporting puts the number of drone strikes in Yemen,
Pakistan and Somalia in Trump’s first two years in office at 238, as
compared with 186 by the Obama administration in 2009 to 2010, the

2021]

STATE AND NONSTATE ACTORS IN POSTWAR HOSTILITIES

1183

first two years of the Obama administration.76 In Somalia alone, the
Trump administration engaged in 192 drone strikes across the four
years of that administration, a significant increase from the Obama
administration’s forty-three in the same region.77 And indeed, the
numbers of drone strikes during the Trump administration may be
substantially higher, given the increasing lack of transparency of the
US government on its use of remote aerial vehicles. President Trump,
for example, revoked an order put in place by President Obama
requiring reporting of civilian deaths from US drone strikes.78 Until
the killing of Qassim Soleimani, the Trump administration appeared
to be simply continuing the pattern Obama had inherited from the
Bush administration, but with greater intensity. The Soleimani killing,
however, took the US targeted killing program to a new level.
Long considered dangerous to US forces abroad and part of the
Iranian mechanism for state-sponsored terrorism, Soleimani had been
in the sights of both the Obama and Bush administrations, but foreign
policy and military experts from those administrations had uniformly
agreed that a strike on Soleimani would create a dangerous escalation
and was unacceptably risky.79 What both administrations understood
was that taking out a high-ranking military leader could be regarded
as an act of war and might entitle Iran to retaliate in self-defense.
Needless to say, neither administration had asked Congress for
authorization to engage in targeted killing operations, even when these
occurred outside of zones of armed conflict, which no doubt would have
focused merely on the question of congressional authorization under
the 2001 and 2002 AUMFs.80
History bears witness to the fact that a single assassination of a
state actor can precipitate an international armed conflict. The killing
of Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife in 1914 was the spark that
ignited the First World War, given that the Austro-Hungarian Empire
blamed the killing on the Serbian government, and the complex
network of alliances quickly produced a descent into international

76.
Spencer Ackerman, Trump Ramped Up Drone Strikes in America’s Shadow
Wars, DAILY BEAST (Nov. 26, 2018, 10:38AM), https://www.thedailybeast.com/trumpramped-up-drone-strikes-in-americas-shadow-wars
[https://perma.cc/55V8-ZK4N]
(archived Nov. 29, 2021).
77.
See Sara Toth Stub, Targeted Killings, 31 CQ RESEARCHER 1, 5 (2021),
http://library.cqpress.com/cqresearcher/document.php?action=print&id=cqresrre202104
0900 (last visited Sept. 13, 2021) [https://perma.cc/2YLD-Z4AV] (archived Sept. 13,
2021).
78.
Charlie Savage, Trump Revokes Obama-Era Rule on Disclosing Civilian
Casualties From U.S. Airstrikes Outside War Zones, N.Y. TIMES (March 6, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/06/us/politics/trump-civilian-casualties-rulerevoked.html [https://perma.cc/QKZ7-CA9J] (archived Nov. 29, 2021).
79.
See Gordon Adams, The Iran Long Game: Bush v. Obama, FOREIGN POL’Y
(April 14, 2015, 3:04 PM), https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/04/14/the-iran-long-game-bushvs-obama-nukes/ [https://perma.cc/D64X-6XK9] (archived Sept. 13, 2021).
80.
See Authorization for the Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107–40, 115 Stat.
224 (2001).
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military conflict. Yet, while the ingredients were present for
Soleimani’s killing to produce a comparable conflagration, the only
immediate consequence was an Iranian attack on two US air bases in
Iraq, resulting in traumatic brain injuries for over one hundred
servicemen but no fatalities.81 Although Iran labeled the killing of
Soleimani “an act of war,”82 and other world leaders appeared to have
sympathy with that characterization,83 the United States did not
thereby catapult itself, Iran, and their respective allies into an
international conflagration. Unlike the response of the AustroHungarian Empire in 1914, Iran’s response was ultimately tepid and
the price the United States paid mostly diplomatic.
The critical question Trump introduced, and one that was not
clearly answered after the Soleimani strike, is whether targeted killing
of state actors is ever permissible outside a theater of war, and if so,
under what theory it can be justified. From the above discussion, it
should be clear that where state agency exists, targeting is normally
permissible only when in a state of armed conflict with the target
nation. If no such state of war exists, there must be a legitimate casus
belli to start a war, such as that the other country has engaged in a
significant violation of the sovereignty rights of the country seeking to
use force, or that there is a violation of the rights of a third party
nation. In short, the legality of the action must be judged by
considerations drawn from the domain of the jus ad bellum.84 With the
exception of the rare instances in which the use of preemptive force
may be used in anticipation of the need for immediate defensive action,
a first strike on a sovereign nation is not permissible under
international law. This is clearly articulated in Article 51 of the UN
Charter, the basic provision that governs the use of force among
nations.

81.
David Martin, Inside the Attack That Almost Sent the U.S. to War with Iran,
CBS NEWS (August 8, 2021), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/iran-missle-strike-al-asadairbase-60-minutes-2021-08-08/ [https://perma.cc/NY5Q-6Q49] (archived Sept. 13,
2021); Diana Stancy Correll, 109 US Troops Diagnosed with TBI After Iran Missle
Barrage Says Pentagon in Latest Update, MIL. TIMES (Feb. 10, 2020),
https://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-military/2020/02/10/more-than-100-ustroops-diagnosed-with-tbi-after-irans-attack-at-al-asad-report/ [https://perma.cc/GHU37TEG] (archived Sept. 13, 2021).
82.
World Reacts to Killing of Iran’s Qassem Soleimani, EURONEWS (Mar. 1,
2020), https://www.euronews.com/2020/01/03/a-declaration-of-war-and-an-escalationthe-world-reacts-to-soleimani-killing [https://perma.cc/M29V-E2J3] (archived Sept. 13,
2021).
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See Loveday Morris & Michael Birnbaum, U.S. Killing of Iran’s top
Commander Unnerves Allies, Dims Hopes Iran Nuclear Deal Can Be Saved, WASH. POST
(Jan.
3,
2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/us-killing-of-irans-topcommander-rattles-european-allies/2020/01/03/0012822e-2e19-11ea-bffe020c88b3f120_story.html [https://perma.cc/DKS4-T5XF] (archived Sept. 22, 2021).
84.
MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS: A MORAL ARGUMENT WITH
HISTORICAL ILLUSTRATIONS 21 (4th ed. 2006); see Claire Finkelstein, Targeted Killing as
Preemptive Action, in TARGETED KILLINGS: LAW AND MORALITY IN AN ASYMMETRICAL
WORLD 156, 160 (Claire Finkelstein, Jens David Ohlin, & Andrew Altman, eds., 2012).
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A critical question, then, is whether it is legitimate to adopt the
doctrine of national self-defense to justify the strike on Soleimani. This
in turn raises the thorny question of the permissible scope of
preemptive or anticipatory self-defense under Article 51.85 On the face
of that provision, it does not seem necessary for an actual kinetic strike
to have occurred in order for the United States to invoke its inherent
right of self-defense. The concept of “anticipatory self-defense” goes
back at least to 1837 and the Caroline Affair, which arguably
established the doctrine of pre-emptive war in international law.86 The
crisis arose when an expedition of Canadian rebels crossed over into
US territory to escape British forces. They boarded the ship Caroline,
where they were attacked by British forces on the American side of the
Niagara River.87 The British party lit the Caroline ablaze and untied
it from its moorings, whereupon it was promptly lost when it went over
Niagara Falls.88 The question arose whether the destruction of the ship
fell within the legitimate purview of the Canadian right of self-defense.
In an exchange of letters on the case, Daniel Webster and Alexander
Baring appeared to agree that anticipatory self-defense is part of the
law of self-defense. However, as Webster expressed it, self-defense
could only be established if the state could show “a necessity of selfdefense, instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no
moment for deliberation.”89 This was the first case to clearly state the
need for states to satisfy the imminence requirement in the context of
international relations and the law of armed conflict. But the case also
had the effect of affirming the permissibility of preemptive self-defense
in an international armed conflict.
The concept of preemptive self-defense was confirmed as a part of
IHL in the landmark case of Nicaragua v. United States,90 which came
before the International Court of Justice in 1984, regarding military
and paramilitary activities on the part of the United States in El
Salvador to foment violence against Nicaragua. Without admitting to
the alleged conduct, the United States claimed to be acting in defense
of its right of “collective self-defense” on behalf of El Salvador and,

85.
See Alex Potcovaru, The International Law of Anticipatory Self-Defense and
U.S. Options in North Korea, LAWFARE (Aug. 8, 2017, 1:56 PM),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/international-law-anticipatory-self-defense-and-usoptions-north-korea [https://perma.cc/PMA5-9S2Q] (archived Sept. 13, 2021) (analyzing
the validity of self-defense under international law).
86.
See Matthew C. Waxman, Self-Defensive Force against Cyber Attacks: Legal,
Strategic and Political Dimensions, 89 INT’L L. STUD. 109, 111 (2013) (“A strict reading
‘armed attack’ would confine its meaning to kinetic violence . . . but it is difficult to
square with the treatment of chemical or biological weapons attacks . . . ”).
87.
See Matthew Waxman, The ‘Caroline’ Affair in the Evolving International
Law of Self-Defense, LAWFARE (Aug. 28, 2018, 2:26 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/
caroline-affair [https://perma.cc/ME3P-UN5M] (archived Sept. 13, 2021).
88.
See id.
89.
See id.
90.
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v.
U.S.), Judgment, 1984 I.C.J. 392, ¶ 91 (November 26).
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thus, to be asserting as third-party defense the right of El Salvador to
act in anticipatory self-defense.91 The alleged activities involved in
acting on this claim of self-defense were based on CIA covert operations
in assistance of El Salvador, such as the mining of Nicaraguan harbors,
attacks on Nicaraguan airports and shipping ports, and attacks on oil
storage facilities as well as on helicopters and boats.92 The ICJ
affirmed the principle of anticipatory self-defense but placed limits on
the scope of that doctrine.93 It held in this case that the United States
had exceeded the bounds of any reasonable right to self-defense, given
the lack of any assertion of imminence in El Salvador’s self-defense
claim.94
In Soleimani’s case, the American public does not have access to
the intelligence that would be required to make a full assessment of
the danger Soleimani posed and whether his killing would indeed
forestall the risk of harm to US persons. While it cannot be doubted
that Soleimani had hostile intentions towards the United States and
had fomented violence over the years against the United States and
other Western powers, retribution for past wrongs is not a valid basis
for exercising the jus ad bellum right to engage in a military strike
against a sovereign nation. The question, therefore, must hinge
entirely on the danger Soleimani posed prospectively, the imminence
of that danger, and the effectiveness of the proposed military means of
forestalling it. From the evidence that was presented before Congress
and in news reports to the American people, as well as the decision of
the two previous administrations—one Democratic, one Republican—
not to strike Soleimani, it seems most likely that the evidence would
not support a claim of imminence, and thus the argument from
preemption would likely fail.
A second argument, however, might seem to show greater
promise. The argument is that insofar as Soleimani was planning
terroristic activities against the United States by making use of his
Quds Force and a network of terrorists with whom they are connected,
he should be thought of as wearing two hats, meaning that he
functioned both as a state and nonstate actor. As such, the analysis
used with respect to nonstate actors generally can be applied here. The
question then arises: How should international states treat individuals
who occupy multiple categories in international law? That question has
no established answer as of yet. But this Article asserts that the

91.
92.
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James P. Rowles, U.S. Covert Operations Against Nicaragua and Their
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identification of an individual as a state actor should take precedence
over any other identification he may have.
One of the arguments for “dual hattedness” goes back to the
criteria for combatancy discussed in Part II, namely the condition that
valid state combatants must respect the laws of war. If respecting the
laws of war is a criterion for combatancy, then failure to respect those
laws would automatically result in a forfeiture of immunity. It would
follow that dealing with "dual hatted" state actors would absolve other
countries of adherence to the laws of war, and thus eliminate the
concept of war crimes for both sides, thus exempting any state that
conducts terroristic activities from the strictures of the law of war. It
would follow that no state could violate the laws of war in such a case
Rather than exempting Soleimani from the domain of state agency
given his willingness to violate the terms of international law, the
attribution should instead run the other way: insofar as Iran allowed
Soleimani to retain his official position as leader of the Quds Force, as
well as other official state functions, any actions in which he engaged
that violated international law can be attributed to the state. This is
consistent, for example, with the Tadic case, in which the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia held that it is
permissible to ascribe the conduct of organized armed groups to states
if that state exercises “overall control” over those groups.95 This
suggests that even in an unconventional, asymmetric conflict there is
no reason to exempt the analysis of the threat posed by a state actor
from the general laws of war. Thus, if Soleimani were to plan an
unprovoked attack against American citizens and did so repeatedly,
his actions could be attributed to the sovereign nation of Iran, and Iran
must in turn bear responsibility for his conduct.
While the logic of dual hattedness is clear, it cannot be used to
justify a kinetic strike against a state actor since state-actor status
must override nonstate-actor designation under IHL. Moreover, the
dual-hatted argument is a dangerous one to make. The argument
would contribute most significantly to the erosion of the rule of law in
armed conflict as it would permit a host country like Iran to avoid
responsibility for the acts of its officials and to intentionally disclaim
its duty to discipline Soleimani on the grounds that he was not acting
in his official capacity when he fomented or planed violence against
other nations.
This approach clearly poses a significant obstacle to the use of
force against a state actor, insofar as it requires any attack on such an
individual to be justified under jus ad bellum analysis. But the
imposition of this hurdle is fully appropriate. It should not be easy to
justify the use of force against a leader of a foreign sovereign nation,
but if a state actor does engage or is about to engage in a kinetic strike

95.
See Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶
120 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999).
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on US persons, the state must bear the responsibility for his actions in
most instances. And indeed, in view of the official Section 1264 report
to Congress regarding the Soleimani strike, where he is described as
the “leader of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Quds Force,”
and the purpose of the strike is identified as “to deter Iran,” “degrade
Iran’s and Quds Force-based militias’ ability to conduct attacks,” and
“end Iran’s strategic escalation of attacks,”96 there is a clear
implication that the target was, from the start, conceived as the
independent sovereign nation of Iran.
VI. PRESERVING THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN WAR AND CRIME
What should be clear from the above discussion is that the nature
of warfare has changed dramatically over the course of the past fifty
years, starting at least with Vietnam and continuing with the war on
terror. The evolving nature of warfare, however, does not require a
wholesale revision of the legal concepts used to understand war and to
establish rules for the treatment of both combatants and civilians
within it. The biggest legal challenge post–9/11 in the domain of war
has been determining the status of violent nonstate actors organized
into large militia-like hierarchies. Distinguishing state from nonstate
actors in conflict without effacing the line between armed conflict and
civilian law enforcement has been a central challenge. There are, in
effect, four categories that emerge from these two critical distinctions:

96.
NOTICE ON THE LEGAL AND POLICY FRAMEWORKS GUIDING THE UNITED
STATES’ USE OF MILITARY FORCE AND RELATED NATIONAL SECURITY OPERATIONS 1
(2020),
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16, 2021).
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Table 1
Military Hostilities
International Armed
United States

Conflict/ Status-based

Fights State

combatancy,

Actor

POW status if captured
under the LOAC

Law Enforcement
Immunity for state actors or
possible criminal liability—
governed by jus ad bellum and
criminal law

Civilian immunity or
United States
Fights
Nonstate Actor

civilians engaged in

Criminal law/extradition/capture

hostilities,

mission/targeting in self-defense if

Activity-based or

capture infeasible,

continuous combat

Activity-based assessment

functional status

Since 9/11, the most important and yet the most difficult domain
to categorize is the bottom-left corner of Table 1, namely the category
of violent nonstate actors who are engaged in a military-style conflict
of high intensity with a hierarchically organized group possessing a
command and control structure. This is the group the Bush
administration dubbed “unlawful combatants,” thus using a hybrid
categorization to justify indefinite detention and interrogation without
extending POW status. As the foregoing discussion indicates, this
solution is highly problematic from the standpoint of the law of war.
A number of commentators have suggested that this category
should be treated as “functionally” equivalent to traditional
combatants, as a way of resurrecting the idea of a status-based
assessment of the targeting decision. Jens Ohlin, for example, has
argued that if an individual functions within an organization in the
way that traditional combatants do in the state military hierarchy,
that person should count as a full-blown combatant from the
standpoint of the LOAC.97 He writes: “The functional equivalent in
cases of targeted killings would link the individual to the collective
terrorist group if the individual is a card-carrying member of a terrorist
organization or a self-declared enemy of the United States.”98 He goes
on to explain that an individual terrorist bears the right relationship
to the terrorist organization for purposes of combatancy if the
organization is hierarchically organized, the individual in question is

97.
For a more detailed discussion of accountability for torture, see Claire
Finkelstein and Stephen Xenakis, Repairing the Damage from Illegal Acts of State: The
Costs of Failed Accountability for Torture, in INTERROGATION AND TORTURE:
INTEGRATING EFFICACY WITH LAW AND MORALITY 493, 493–517 (Steven Barela, Mark
Fallon, Gloria Gaggioli, & Jens David Ohlin eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2020).
98.
Jens David Ohlin, Targeting Co-Belligerents, in TARGETED KILLINGS IN
ASYMMETRICAL WAR 60, 80 (Claire Finkelstein, Jens David Ohlin, & Andrew Altman,
eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2012).
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given orders or instructions to act on behalf of that organization, and
there is a common ideology or group that unites the members of that
organization and makes them into a single entity.99
The Obama administration appears to have taken just such a
functional approach, as it made clear in its response to a habeas
petition it filed in 2009:
Under a functional analysis, individuals who provide substantial support to alQaida forces in other parts of the world may properly be deemed part of al-Qaida
itself. Such activities may also constitute the type of substantial support that, in
analogous circumstances in a traditional international armed conflict, is
sufficient to justify detention.100

But the government’s brief does not explain why the fact that
serving the same function in an international armed conflict (IAC)
would justify the parallel conclusion with regard to al-Qaeda in this
very different context (which the Obama administration characterized
as a NIAC), the conclusion being that an individual who renders
material support is a member of al-Qaeda and thus counts as a
combatant. The missing analysis seems particularly important given
that the status of al-Qaeda is itself unclear under the LOAC. Thus,
establishing membership in al-Qaeda on the basis of material support
may not justify the conclusion that such individuals are “combatants,”
though it seems one can draw that same conclusion from the fact of
material support alone under some circumstances.
Convenient as this middle ground would be for the ability of the
law of war to absorb the nonstate terrorist into its jurisprudence, the
functionalist approach arguably misses the point of the traditional
concept of combatancy, which has to do with the relationship of the
combatant to the identity of the state. The point is not that the concept
of combatancy identifies individuals who act as part of a group, any
group, as long as that group is sufficiently large, hierarchically
organized, and the actions of its members reflect the ideology of the
group. If this were the criteria for combatancy, it would be difficult to
distinguish drug lords from foreign militaries, with the result that the
meaning of the combatant status would be significantly altered.
Instead, there is a way to bring the view of the Obama
administration within the fold of the traditional law of war: one can
say that violent nonstate actors are targetable within traditional zones
of hostility, because they are combatants, but that they must be
captured rather than killed outside of such zones, assuming that
capture is feasible. The functionalist category of “unlawful
combatancy” or its equivalent is not necessary to justify lethal

99.
100.

Id. at 86.
Respondents’ Memorandum Regarding the Government’s Detention
Authority Relative to Detainees Held at Guantanamo Bay at 7, In Re Guantanamo Bay
Detainee Litigation, Misc. No. 08-442, (D.D.C. Mar. 13, 2009).
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operations in such cases. This is to say that members of al-Qaeda and
the Taliban, and later ISIS, were “civilians directly participating in
hostilities,” a category that is well accepted under the LOAC.101 It
might then be argued that in Northern Iraq and Afghanistan, the level
of intensity of the fighting was so great that such civilians “directly
participating” can be considered civilian-combatants under
international law, given that they serve “a continuous combat
function.”102 In other words, within zones of armed combat, such as in
Northern Iraq and Afghanistan, civilians directly participating in
hostilities might be thought of as participants in a NIAC, yet these
same individuals revert to their civilian status outside this context.
There is no contradiction in saying both that nonstate actors are
“civilians” and that they are “directly participating in hostilities.”
Indeed, the Obama administration’s designation of the war on terror
as a NIAC contemplates precisely this, despite the fact that it was not
limited to a single state, as would normally be part of the concept of a
NIAC. In theory, to say someone is a participant in an IAC means he
is a state actor, and that automatically makes him a combatant in the
full, status-based sense of the term.103 It also means he has combatant
immunity, and if captured, he has full POW status under the Geneva
Conventions, provided that he properly distinguishes himself from the
civilian population.104 Participants in an irregular conflict, by contrast,
do not have the same status, and if captured, they do not have full POW
protection.105 They are targetable, however, but not as a function of
status, in contrast to the approach of the Bush and Obama
administrations,106 but rather because of the dangerousness of their
activities. For nonstate actors to be continuously targetable, however,
is another matter. Hostilities must reach a certain level of intensity
and the non-governmental armed forces involved must be
hierarchically organized according to a formal command structure.107
In addition to receiving some protections under the Geneva
Conventions,108 participants in an irregular conflict receive protection

101.
102.
103.

Direct Participation in Hostilities, supra note 64.
See Ohlin, supra note 98, at 82–85.
See INT’L COMM. RED CROSS, HOW IS THE TERM “ARMED CONFLICT DEFINED
IN INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW? 2 (March 2008), https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/
assets/files/other/opinion-paper-armed-conflict.pdf
[https://perma.cc/AG2A-HHEK]
(archived Sept. 17, 2021).
104. See JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK , INT’L COMM. RED
CROSS, STUDY ON CUSTOMARY INT’L HUMANITARIAN L. RULE 106 (Cambridge Univ. Press
2005), https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule106 (last visited
Sept. 17, 2021) [https://perma.cc/GZA8-89AM] (archived Sept. 17, 2021).
105. See Non-International Armed Conflict, How Does Law Protect in War?,
https://casebook.icrc.org/glossary/non-international-armed-conflict (last visited Sept. 17,
2021) [https://perma.cc/4MGX-ANSA] (archived Sept. 17, 2021).
106. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 628–31 (2006).
107. See Non-International Armed Conflict, supra note 105.
108. See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 3,
Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.
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from Additional Protocol I.109 For example, combatant protection for
POWs is clearly articulated under Article 44 of Additional Protocol I,
which extends protection even to those who have violated some of the
rules of international law in armed conflict under most conditions.110
Additional Protocol I provides that those who fall captive while failing
to observe the obligation to wear arms openly “shall, nevertheless, be
given protections equivalent in all respects to those accorded to
prisoners of war by the Third Convention and by this Protocol.”111 In
other words, even those who, like members of al-Qaeda and the
Taliban, violate the most basic laws of war must be treated as
humanely as official POWs.
The approach offered above appears to be comparable to that of
the Israeli Supreme Court, which articulated a framework based on a
traditional model of civilian engagement in hostilities.112 The court
vigorously rejected the Bush administration’s device of calling violent
nonstate actors “unlawful combatants,” maintaining that this category
had not been recognized in customary international law.113 Chief
Justice Barak found that the Palestinian militants targeted by Israel
were not combatants of any sort, but rather civilians who had in some
cases forfeited their protected status by choosing to take part in
hostilities.114 The court found support for its approach in IHL under
Article 51(3) of Additional Protocol I, which provides that “[c]ivilians
shall enjoy the protection afforded by this Section, unless and for such
time as they take a direct part in hostilities,”115 a position that the
court recognized as consistent with customary international law.116
The question, then, becomes under what conditions a civilian can be
considered to have “directly participated in hostilities”? How far back
is the engagement of those who organize and support an attack behind
the scenes traced? The court took a reasonably broad view of this
question, against the position of the plaintiffs who argued for a narrow
approach. The court thought that civilians who finance and support

109.
110.

Additional Protocol I, art. 44.
See id. (identifying as an exception an individual who fails to carry his arms
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111. Id.
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those in active hostilities could be considered civilians directly
participating.117
For present purposes, the exact line of demarcation between
protected civilians and civilians engaging in hostilities is not what is
most critical, though that is a question that must be solved in a fuller
account of this type of approach. What is of greater importance is
whether a hybrid approach can be integrated into the traditional law
of war. Treating violent nonstate actors as civilians seems like the
right approach, but it is also one that requires an account of how and
when such civilians make themselves targetable. The general approach
of the Israeli Supreme Court is to regard civilians as targetable when
they engage in conduct that would trigger the right of self-defense
under Article 51 of the UN Charter on the part of state actors. Once
civilians conduct themselves in ways that threaten the lives of state
actors, they forfeit their protected status.
Normally, civilians who become targetable would regain that
protection as soon as they cease to pose a threat. The Israeli Supreme
Court, however, said that a civilian who is a member of a terrorist
organization and whose role is to regularly participate in a chain of
hostilities, “with short periods of rest between them,” effectively may
be targeted at any time, since “the rest between hostilities is nothing
other than preparation for the next hostility.”118 An individual who fits
this description is not a combatant, but the requirement under
Additional Protocol I that they may be targeted “for such time” as they
are engaged in hostilities is applicable to them.119 The ICRC reaches a
comparable conclusion, but characterizes such a person as a nonstate
combatant.120 The ICRC says that once that conduct amounts to a
sufficiently high level of intensity, it is reasonable to think the nonstate
actors are serving a “continuous combat function,” meaning that they
are targetable continuously, thus mimicking the liability of state actors
who are targetable on the basis of status.
In the case of civilians directly participating in hostilities, the
permissibility of targeting will depend on the self-defense framework
that applies in the context of law enforcement. Thus, in order for it to
be permissible to target a civilian, even one engaged in hostilities, that
person must pose a threat of imminent harm, or alternatively, it must
be necessary to act preemptively to forestall the harm, even if the harm

117.
118.
119.
120.

Id. ¶¶ 34–37.
Id. ¶ 39.
See id. ¶¶ 39–40; Additional Protocol I, 51(3).
See Nils Melzer, Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation
in Hostilities Under International Humanitarian Law, 2009 INT’L COMM. RED CROSS 51,
71–73, https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/assets/files/other/icrc-002-0990.pdf (last visited Sept.
17, 2021) [https://perma.cc/D7L7-VFUC] (archived Sept. 17, 2021).
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itself is not imminent.121 While there are different approaches to both
personal and national self-defense on the question of imminence, the
general pattern is consistent: the justification for engaging in lethal
force depends on the immediacy of the threat that needs to be
forestalled or the urgency of the need to forestall it.122 It is therefore
unnecessary to create a new legal framework that makes use of hybrid
categories like “unlawful combatancy” in order to articulate a coherent
framework for dealing with violent nonstate actors.
Once it is determined that the nonstate actor poses a serious risk
of harm and that it is necessary to act immediately to forestall that
harm, the question is whether it is feasible to capture and detain that
individual. In a law of war framework, of course, it is not necessary to
attempt capture prior to killing.123 But in a civilian framework, even
when the threat is imminent, capture must be attempted provided it is
feasible and provided that the threat can be adequately prevented
through capture.124
Of course, the meaning of “feasibility” in this context is complex.
The question usually boils down to what degree of risk to combatants
is required before capture is declared infeasible. Particularly where
drones are concerned, capturing a suspect requires confronting much
greater risk than is involved in killing him, given that capture
operations must be conducted in proximity to the target. The killing of
Osama bin Laden, for example, was presented as a capture operation,
but it seems more likely that the option of capture was never seriously
considered.125 Immediately following the announcement of the bin
Laden strike, President Obama said he had directed Leon Panetta,
then director of the CIA, “to make the killing or capture of bin Laden
the top priority of our war against al Qaeda,” and that, at his direction,
the United States “launched a targeted operation against [bin Laden’s]
compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan.”126 That statement did not clarify
whether the operation was a targeted killing operation or whether it

121. See Ignaz Stegmiller, The Right of Self-Defense Under Article 51 of the UN
Charter Against the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, 90 DIE FRIEDENS-WARTE 245,
265–70 (2015) (discussing the need for a broader conception of imminence).
122. See generally Finkelstein, supra note 84 (introducing the concept of
preemptive killing to provide a rationale for targeted killing in which harm is nonimminent).
123. See Jens Ohlin, The Duty to Capture, CORNELL L. FAC. PUBL’N 1268, 1269–70
(2013), https://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2001&context=
facpub (last visited Sept. 17, 2021) [https://perma.cc/VA8X-S3N5] (archived Sept.17,
2021).
124. Id.
125. Yochi Dreazen, Aamer Madhani, & Marc Ambinder, The Goal Was Never to
Capture bin Laden, ATLANTIC (May 4, 2011), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/
archive/2011/05/the-goal-was-never-to-capture-bin-laden/238330/
[https://perma.cc/
EG49-WVB9] (archived Sept. 17, 2021).
126. Macon Phillips, Osama Bin Laden Dead, WHITE HOUSE (May 2, 2011, 12:16
AM),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2011/05/02/osama-bin-laden-dead
[https://perma.cc/CFU7-5264] (archived Sept. 17, 2021).
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was originally a capture mission, but there were no statements to the
effect that the United States intended to capture bin Laden and bring
him back to stand trial.
Finally, once the threat posed by the nonstate actor has been
determined to be imminent or the need to use of force immediate, and
capture has been determined to be infeasible, the question is whether
it is permissible to breach the sovereignty of the host country where
the suspected terrorist resides. The concept of sovereignty in
international law would suggest that it is not. The autonomy of each
nation normally overrules the need of an aggrieved country to demand
access to a suspected terrorist who has performed acts of violence
against it. In the case of Osama bin Laden, for example, Pakistan in
theory had the right to refuse to turn bin Laden over to the Americans.
However, if a country is harboring a criminal (or suspected terrorist)
and that person poses a continuing danger, yet the host country is
unwilling or unable to turn that person over to stand trial or to
otherwise eliminate the danger, the aggrieved country may take
matters into its own hands and act against him.127 While it was widely
suspected that Pakistan probably did covertly extend permission to the
Americans to conduct its raid on the bin Laden compound, arguably if
it had not granted that permission, the United States might have been
entitled to act to defend itself in any event. If Pakistan harbors a
terrorist and refuses to take steps to protect other nations from the
harm he poses, then other countries can consider Pakistan either
“unable” or “unwilling” to neutralize the danger, and they can then
take matters into their own hands.
Needless to say, no comparable doctrine exists in the law of war.
If an enemy belligerent escapes from the zone of armed conflict and
crosses the border into a neighboring country, the United States as the
pursuing country is not permitted to breach the sovereignty of the
nonbelligerent nation. To proceed with a strike in such a case would be
tantamount to an act of hostility against the harboring nation and
could lead to drawing that country into war. Consider, for example, a
fanciful case in which Hitler had fled Germany towards the end of the
war and escaped to Switzerland. Imagine US forces had stopped
pursuing him at the Swiss border and had then demanded permission
to enter Switzerland to target Hitler. If Switzerland had refused such
a request and American forces proceeded nevertheless, US military
action inside Switzerland could well be considered an attack on
Switzerland itself, despite the fact that US actions would be directed
against a German citizen and a member of the German military. The

127. See Elena Chachko & Ashley Deeks, Which States Support the ‘Unwilling and
Unable’ Test?, LAWFARE (Oct. 10, 2016), https://www.lawfareblog.com/which-statessupport-unwilling-and-unable-test [https://perma.cc/UH9T-LWQY] (archived Sept. 17,
2021).
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“unable or unwilling” doctrine would not give the United States leave
to ignore Swiss sovereignty.
The line between combatants and civilians, even civilians directly
participating in hostilities, is thus of the utmost importance for
establishing the legal framework in which kill or capture operations
take place. Once again, a fuller treatment of this topic would be
necessary to clarify the meaning of “direct participation in hostilities”
and where to draw the line between that category and civilians who
are not sufficiently involved to count as “direct participants.” But for
present purposes, the focus of this Article is only on establishing the
correct framework for determining the status of violent nonstate
actors. The framework this Article has set out makes clear that there
is a viable way to understand violent nonstate actors based on
traditional law of war categories and that it is therefore unnecessary
to establish new categories such as “unlawful combatancy” in order to
determine the treatment to which such individuals may be subjected.
VII. THE ROLE OF THE STATE IN ESTABLISHING COMBATANCY
Stepping back from the above details, the question arises what the
basis is for distinguishing violent nonstate actors from violent state
actors, where the latter’s methods are as brutal and threatening as the
former. What is significant about the fact that a combatant acts in the
name of a state on the traditional account is that it is a politically
recognized, autonomous, and sovereign entity, one that possesses the
same rights and entitlements as other sovereign entities with whom it
might have disagreements. In the traditional approach to the law of
war, states are special and different from other organizations in
multiple ways; one of particularly great importance is the concept of
state sovereignty. Since states do not rule each other and there is little
in the way of common law that governs relations among states, war is
the last resort for autonomous entities that have no common judge or
other sovereign to whom they can appeal to settle their differences.
Within a given state, the matter is entirely different: where, as Hobbes
would say, there is “a common power to keep them all in awe,” there is
no need, in theory, to resort to war.128 The law, as implemented by the
sovereign under whose power it falls, provides the answers, as any use
of force in that context is usually not an act of war but a crime.
Accounts that attempt to find a middle ground between
combatancy and criminal responsibility, or, more particularly, attempt
to bring terrorism within the fold of combatancy by revising the
definition of the latter, create the risk of weakening the limits on war
and the prerogatives of civil authority within a given legal regime. The
concept of combatancy is integrally linked to the concept of “armed
conflict.” When there is armed conflict there are combatants, and
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without that designation of their activities, it cannot be said that those
individuals are belligerents. Thus, the functionalist view of
combatancy, insofar as it broadens that concept, also broadens the
concept of armed conflict. There are grave risks, however, involved in
expanding that notion. Partly, this has occurred because of the
unbounded nature of war: military confrontations tend now to have no
distinct beginning, middle, or end, as well as no clear location. A
further loosening of the criteria for what counts as armed conflict risks
it losing the distinctiveness of war, with its particular rules and norms,
resulting in a state of affairs the famous theorist of war Von Clausewitz
described as a hellish descent into “absolute war.”129
On the alternative view, this Article suggests that violent
nonstate actors are civilians, albeit civilians engaged in militaristic
activity. Violent nonstate actors may be thought of as highly dangerous
members of an illegal criminal conspiracy, precisely on par with violent
members of drug cartels and comparable to the Revolutionary Armed
Forces of Columbia (FARC), one of the largest organized crime
syndicates in history.130 Efforts to combat such groups lie within the
ambit of law-enforcement practices and international efforts to fight
political terrorism as coordinated law-enforcement operations among
sovereign nations with a stake in the outcome. While such an approach
may appear to tie the hands of the US military and its ability to defend
the country from terrorism, this is not the case, as military tools and
methods can be deployed to fight civilian threats. Indeed, the civil law
enforcement model possesses great advantages, both for the rule of law
and for national security efforts in fighting terrorism.
First, and most notably, there is a legal advantage in approaching
terrorists as members of a criminal conspiracy, in which mere
membership is per se illegal. Under the armed conflict approach that
has dominated since 9/11, there is little basis for condemning members
of al-Qaeda or ISIS because terrorists are combatants. The concept of
“combatancy,” after all, affords as much protection and entitlement as
it does targetability.131 There is no reason, however, to dignify
membership in al-Qaeda or ISIS with the protection and status that
state military organizations possess. The latter are legitimate because
sovereign states are entitled to defend their existence, but al-Qaeda
and ISIS deserve no such protection. If the organizations themselves
are illegal, membership in them should also be illegal.
The question that must be considered carefully, however, is the
extent to which the civilian law-enforcement model can apply within

129. See generally CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ, ON WAR (Michael Howard & Peter
Paret eds., Michael Howard & Peter Paret trans., 1976).
130. See generally Jeremy McDermott, The Changing Face of Colombian
Organized Crime, PERSPECTIVAS (Sept. 2014), https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/laseguridad/11153.pdf [https://perma.cc/9AFV-5UA4] (archived Sept. 17, 2021) (discussing
the structure and the metamorphosis of Colombian drug cartels).
131. See supra Part II.

1198

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL. 54:1163

armed conflict—that is, to a high-intensity battle with nonstate actors
where the civilians in question can be classified as serving “a
continuous combat function.” And relatedly, should they still be treated
according to the combatancy model suggested in Geneva for
combatants in a NIAC? Or should they be treated instead according to
the civilian law-enforcement model discussed above? Additional
Protocol I supports the view that violent nonstate actors should be
thought of as on a par with civilians taking part in hostilities. Although
the Additional Protocol does not specifically articulate such a
conception, nonstate combatants would be targetable on an activitybased theory, rather than a purely status-based account. In the case of
high-intensity conflict, such as occurred in Afghanistan and Iraq, state
actors can target nonstate combatants in a continuous fashion because
the threat they pose is continuous and the activity in which they are
engaged is hostile. As the level of threat diminishes, however, activitybased targeting would require a greater demonstration of threat. Such
would be the case outside the zone of armed conflict.
What this means for all intents and purposes is that in the case of
al-Qaeda or ISIS in areas covered by the PPG, such individuals are not
serving a continuous combat function and thus are not targetable in
the first instance unless they pose an imminent danger of harm. As
argued in the case of Anwar al-Awlaki, they must be arrested, not
summarily executed, unless the threat they pose warrants the
immediate use of lethal force based on the need to forestall an
imminent danger. On this view, it is problematic to target someone
from a distance unless that person poses an imminent threat and there
is no way to apprehend him. However, the use of drones against
nonstate actors may be justified within the formal zone of armed
conflict, given that the intensity of conflict and the high level of danger
creates an activity-based justification for making the enemy
continuously targetable.
In this regard, international law arrives at roughly the same
conclusion as the Obama administration, but via a somewhat different
route. Targeted killing in Iraq and Afghanistan, which were zones of
conflict for most of the last twenty years, and targeting in other areas,
such as Yemen, Pakistan, Syria, and Somalia, can be properly
distinguished, not because in the zones of armed conflict there are
combatants in a traditional sense and in areas covered by the PPG
there are none. Since nonstate actors are best understood as civilians,
albeit civilians participating in hostilities, they become targetable as
though they were state actors.
Outside a zone of armed conflict, however, the civilian model must
actually prevail in practice over the military model, and individuals
targeted cannot be thought of as combatants in any sense, with the
exception of the self-defense-based killing that applies to every civilian.
This implies that nonstate actors cannot simply be targeted without an
antecedent attempt to capture and a determination that capture is
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“infeasible,” as discussed above. It is only by distorting the feasibility
and imminence requirements that the conclusion emerges that
nonstate actors can be directly targeted under the PPG.
Moreover, the areas covered by the former PPG are still sovereign
nations, and thus it is not permissible under the LOAC to conduct
targeted killings in those areas without permission of the host nation.
In theory, if the United States proceeds without such permission, it is
engaging in an act of war. This once again helps to distinguish conflict
in outlying areas, at the periphery of the conflict, from military
engagement, in which sovereignty considerations would not impede
military engagement.
VIII.

IMPLICATIONS FOR DOMESTIC LAW ENFORCEMENT

This Article has argued in favor of the traditional position that the
notion of combatancy is fundamentally tied to the concept of the state
and the idea of state agency. Because of this, the Article has also
argued that violent nonstate actors are essentially criminal civilians,
rather than combatants, based on the fact that they are nonstate
actors. The discussion has allowed, however, that in the case of highintensity conflict, such civilians may become continuously targetable
based on their levels of activity and the threat they pose. This is what
leads IHL, specifically Additional Protocol I, to treat such nonstate
actors as combatants and to distinguish them from civilians as though
the traditional principle of distinction applied. On the view defended
here, the label “combatant” is only a rough approximation when that
term is used against nonstate actors: individuals are combatants only
in the sense that they are targetable and that they must be treated on
a par with formal POWs, despite the fact that they lack the state-based
identity that provided the true basis for both combatant POW
protections and for targetability based on status.
The insistence on state agency as a feature of combatant identity
connects that concept with the deeper justification for permitting
armed combat, namely that states have equal autonomy and,
accordingly, there is no power over them to resolve disputes between
them. A nonstate actor who wages “war” does not in fact possess that
justification for resolving differences through combat. Instead of
supplying a military justification for acting, he has acted on a principle
that lends itself to resolution within the context of existing state or
interstate political and legal frameworks. To proceed as though he
possessed the same justification as a traditional state actor is to
confuse structure or function with normative principle.
The Obama administration’s imprecise concept of a NIAC at least
suggests that there is a form of warfare that is asymmetric in that it
pits a sovereign state against a large and highly organized militant
organization. When this occurs, the UN Charter suggests that the
LOAC will apply. This, then, underscores the flaw in the Forfeiture
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Theory of compliance with international norms: the fact that al-Qaeda
does not follow international law does not release the United States
from the duty to follow those same norms since the source of authority
of the norms in question is not the compliance of the other party.
With regard to Qassim Soleimani and other state actors, there is
no avoiding the full panoply of rules of the Law of Armed Conflict.
Despite Soleimani’s potentially terroristic activities, his status as a
state actor must take precedence over his nonstate actions. The “dual
hatted” theory does not work as a justification for extrajudicial killing.
Nor, from what is known of the facts, does the theory of self-defense,
which requires an imminent threat to the country or to an individual
state actor. Once the limitations on the moves that can legitimately be
made in this space become clear, it is quite a bit easier to justify those
targeted killings that are legitimate and also easier to protect the
boundaries that demarcate domestic criminal law. The more the
distinction between the law of war and the law of crime is effaced, the
greater the erosion of our constitutional principles like due process,
rights that require constant vigilance to safeguard and protect.
Recent events have made this all too clear. During the summer of
2020, federal agents were deployed to quell domestic disturbances
against supposed Antifa demonstrators as well as against Black Lives
Matter protests in Portland and other cities that were the site of unrest
around the United States.132 And in the wake of the January 6, 2021,
attack on the Capitol building, federal agencies, the U.S. Congress, and
domestic law-enforcement authorities have become alarmed about the
increase in domestic extremism, particularly white supremacist
violence.133 A recent report by the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence, for example, warns that racially motivated domestic
violent extremists “who promote the superiority of the white race” are
the actors “with the most persistent and concerning transnational
connections because individuals with similar ideological beliefs exist
outside of the United States” and that these groups “frequently
communicate with and seek to influence each other.”134 Likewise, data
show a rise in domestic extremism not seen in over twenty-five years,
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driven primarily by white-supremacist, anti-Muslim, and antigovernment extremists on the far right.135
The United States has seen this movie before. In 1985, the
Philadelphia Police Department bombed a residential home occupied
by a militant black group called MOVE following a protracted standoff
in which the police used tear-gas and fired multiple rounds of
ammunition into the house.136 In the bombing and subsequent fire,
eleven people in the house, including five children, died.137 One of the
two MOVE survivors claimed that the police fired on inhabitants as
they were escaping the fire.138 The Philadelphia Special Investigation
Commission, which examined the event, found that “[t]he plan to bomb
the MOVE house was reckless, ill-conceived and hastily approved.
Dropping a bomb on an occupied row house was unconscionable and
should have been rejected out of hand.”139 While the use of excessive
force on domestic populations is not new, the risk that such
confrontations become increasingly militarized lurks in the
background at all times. Unless the law governing the use of force, in
both war and law enforcement, is crystal clear, the practice will
continue to shift in the direction of escalation and increasing use of
military technology.
Polarization and even radicalization of the US population has
created a grave risk that the norms of war will seep into domestic lawenforcement practices as the divisions in American society continue to
grow. Previously clear legal distinctions between the domestic law of
crimes and the law of war have become difficult to maintain. As a
result, other distinctions that are neighboring concepts relating to the
rule of law, such as that between state and nonstate actors or that
between foreign and domestic criminals, are also becoming eroded. The
effects of such erosion have been felt in other countries where illiberal
regimes do not hesitate to turn deadly force on their own populations
as a method of political control. Political assassinations have been a
particularly preferred method of maintaining political control on the
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part of the Russians.140 But a similar phenomenon has occurred in
North Korea, China, Saudi Arabia, Chile, and in many other places
across the globe.
The legal confusion brought to this area and the weakening of
formerly clear legal principles may ultimately open the door to
domestic abuse of the technologies of war. As a result, there is a risk
that the practices the United States exports abroad may not stay on
foreign soil when the conditions for their use are ill-defined. It is
commonplace to suppose that extrajudicial killings, particularly those
involving drone technology, could not occur on US soil, and that the
traditional legal system and constitutional criminal guarantees will
remain untouched by US military and intelligence practices overseas.
But drone technology is already in use by federal law enforcement for
surveillance purposes, as are technologies like bomb-diffusing robots
or other AI-based systems. In addition, the United States now faces a
significant problem of radicalism in the US population, not unlike what
the United States confronted in Iraq and Afghanistan at the beginning
of the war on terror. The rising tide of domestic terrorism may thus
provide precisely the catalyst for a wholesale transformation of
domestic law, one that must be forestalled at all costs.
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